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Abstract
This paper discusses the role of opportunistic punisher who may act
selfishly to free-ride cooperators or not to be exploited by defectors. To
consider opportunistic punisher, we make a change to the sequence of
one-shot public good game; instead of putting action choice first be-
fore punishment, the commitment of punishment is declared first before
choosing the action of each participant. In this commitment-first set-
ting, punisher may use information about her team, and may defect to
increase her fitness in the team. Reversing sequence of public good game
can induce different behavior of punisher, which cannot be considered in
standard setting where punisher always chooses cooperation. Based on
stochastic dynamics developed by evolutionary economists and biologists,
we show that opportunistic punisher can make cooperation evolve where
cooperative punisher fails. This alternative route for the evolution of
cooperation relies paradoxically on the players’ selfishness to profit from
others’ unconditional cooperation and defection.
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1 Introduction
Public good game (PGG) is one of the most active research themes in eco-
nomics and evolutionary biology for last ten years. In typical PGG experi-
ments, G individuals have the opportunity to cooperate and bestow a fixed
amount q into a common resource, or to defect and input nothing. The total
amount in the common is multiplied by a factor r and equally distributed
among the members without regard to their contributions. Average return of
unit investment is qr/G where G is the size of a team. If r < G, a rational
player does not contribute, and Nash equilibrium is universal defection. But,
assuming that all of members cooperates, the return is (r − 1)q that is larger
than that from defection.
This is a classic social dilemma that the Nash equilibrium is different from
the social optimum. As for the case of Prisoner’s Dilemma, academic inter-
ests around PGG also have focused on ways and mechanisms that make the
evolution of cooperation possible. For this purpose, besides from introducing
reputation effect by repeating games, two theoretical methods has been pro-
posed: i) stern punishment that is unrelated to payoff consideration ii) the
option that players exit from the game.
For the first direction, Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000) shows experimental evi-
dences by conducting two-stage version of PGG.1 Obviously, sub-game perfect
equilibrium is that agents never punish in stage two as it lowers their payoff;
hence punishment is not a factor in decisions in stage one; hence no contribu-
tions in stage one as usual. But, ample of experimental studies consistently
show that availability of the punishment mechanism increases contributions
markedly relative to their absence. Further, some punishment does occur
actually.
This influential work has been followed by numerous studies that explore
1In stage one, four subjects play a simple PGG, and in stage two, contributions of
individual members are revealed and any member of the four-player group may choose to
reduce the earnings of any of the other members of the group at cost to himself.
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around punishment, and this implies that punishment in PGG is a key part
of institutional and behavioral mechanism to overcome the social dilemma of
cooperation (Ledyard, 1997; Sigmund, 2007). But, a big piece of puzzle about
punishment is that punishment itself cannot be evolutionarily favored because
this behavior cannot get higher payoff or fitness than defection. Let us imag-
ine the situation that all of population consists of defectors. When a mutant
punisher comes about, her payoff cannot exceed that of other defectors as long
as sufficient cost of punishment is imposed. Even though the role of punish-
ment in the evolution of cooperation in PGG may be reasonably accepted,
this behavior may not be selected and survive in evolutionary process.
Another direction of research based on evolutionary dynamics tries the
power of exit options that makes players avoid worst outcomes in PGG. The
idea is that defection in PGG can be circumvented by making players choose
an option that has an intermediate value between universal defection and high-
frequency cooperation. Brandt et al. (2003) shows that exit option makes evo-
lutionary cycle among cooperation, defection and exit by replicator dynamics.
According to its conclusion, however, this evolutionary cycle by exit option
cannot help the evolution of cooperation in that three strategy enjoys same
payoff or fitness, which means that the participation in PGG is not better
than exit option.
Hauert et al. (2007) proposes that two directions may be interwoven in
the evolution of cooperation. Their Intuition is that defectors may break the
homogeneous population of cooperators, but the equilibrium based on univer-
sal defection can be also shaken by the exit option. When all of population
chooses exiting, cooperation or cooperation with punishment is better choice
for players. If we focus on homogeneous sates, these four states are in evolu-
tionary cycles. Based on evolutionary dynamics, Hauert et al. (2007) shows
that cooperative state can be dominant state, which is a route for the evolution
of cooperation in one-shot PGG game.
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Based on former studies, this paper tries to consider an unexplored theoret-
ical element in PGG by stochastic evolutionary dynamics. We investigate the
role and the effectiveness of punishment in PGG by assuming slightly different
setting of PGG and behavioral pattern of punisher. For this, the sequence of
standard PGG, strategy choice first and punishment with the information of
players’ action, is reversely arranged. So to speak, players commit their pun-
ishment first, and choices action with this information. Also, we introduce the
opportunistic punisher who chooses its strategy based on the number of pun-
isher in her team. Hence, for this new type of punisher, the information about
punishing commitment plays a key role in choosing their actions. Even though
defection of the punisher can hurt herself if she chooses defection, this choice
may pay when there is sufficiently large number of cooperators. Intuitively,
different from Hauert et al. (2007) where the punisher is originated from co-
operator, our punisher is opportunistic in that they deviates from cooperative
strategy when it pays.
The organization of the paper is following: Section 2 succinctly describes
the basic of our PGG and methodology we reply on, stochastic (adaptive)
dynamics. Section 3 shows numerical cases our main discussion. Section 4
presents theoretical extension of this paper with assuming Section 5 is con-
cluding remarks.
2 Setup and Method
PGG, Nash equilibrium and Punishment
This paper is based on a G-person game called Public Good Game. We
consider a well-mixed population of constant size M ≥ 2, and G individuals
are randomly selected and offered the option to participate PGG. Each should
decide whether to contribute for the public good or not; cooperate (C) or
defect (D). For simplicity, players invest fixed an amount c, we assume that
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the contributions of all GC cooperators are multiplied by r > 1 and then
divided among all G players participating in the game. The payoff for each C
and D are given by

rcG
C
G for D
rcG
C
G − c for C.
Nash equilibrium is easily given by considering the benefit generated by
switching from C to D, which is c(1 − rG). It is obvious that players would
play D as long as r < G. This is the social dilemma that resembles Prisoner’s
Dilemma. Most of interests around evolutionary game theory lie in finding
routes or mechanism to overcome this uncooperative state. Can this social
dilemma be evaded through positive or negative devices specifically directed
towards individual players? In this paper, we shall focus on negative and
neutral mechanism: punishment and exit.2
When she quits, σ is her payoff. We call her the Loner (L). When she
participates, her types differentiate her act in a team. The cooperator (C) con-
tributes c = 1 amount to the team, and the defector (D) does not contribute,
but free-rides on other C in her team. After this first round interaction, each
team member can impose a fine β upon each target at a personal cost γ for
each fine. The punisher (P ) does this costly behavior against its own benefit.
For following discussion, basic parameters are summarized as follows:
For considering stochastic dynamics in finite populations, the groups en-
gaging in a public goods game are given by multivariate hyper-geometric sam-
pling. This sampling affects payoffs of each interaction between two types.
Resulting payoffs, fixation probabilities and limiting distribution are given in
Appendix B
2Recently, some experimental evidences show that positive devices can be more effective
in inducing cooperation among participants. In this paper, we remain around punishment
issue, which has been more intensively discussed topics.
5
Parameters Description
M The size of total population
G The size of PGG group
r The multiplier of PGG
β The amount of punishment on a target per punishment
γ The cost of punishment incurred per punishment
σ The payoff of loner leaving a team
Table 1: Parameters of PGG.
Stochastic (adaptive) dynamics
While replicator dynamics provide numerous crucial insights, they are funda-
mentally based on deterministic dynamics in an arbitrarily large, sometimes
infinite, population. Theoretical discussions to overcome this limitation have
considered for a long time in various fields such as theoretical ecology, eco-
nomics or sociology. This paper focuses on a concept developed by economists
and evolutionary biologists, stochastic (adaptive) dynamics of finite popula-
tions.
In evolutionary game theory, stochastic (adaptive) dynamics was intro-
duced to understand long-run behavior, which may differ fundamentally from
the behavior of the deterministic process by law of large number, replicator
dynamics. In replicator dynamics, a state is locally asymptotically stable
if any sufficiently small deviation from the original state vanishes. Young
(1993) criticizes this approach because it treats shocks as if they were isolated
events. Considering that economic system has constant perturbation from
various sources, this assumption of arbitrarily small shock is unsatisfactory.
Especially, persistent shocks can accumulate and tip the process out of the
basin of attraction of asymptotically stable state. Thus, when shock is persis-
tent, generally accepted equilibrium concept, evolutionarily stable strategies,
cannot be used to explain long-term behavior of economic system. Especially,
this theory can predict the probability of staying in different equilibria inde-
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pendently of the initial conditions. The persistent shocks act as a selection
mechanism, and the selection intensity increases the less likely the shocks are.
In the long-run distribution relies on the probability of escaping from various
states, and this are the function of exponential in error rate. This idea was
firstly formalized by Freidlin and Wentzell (1998).3
Stochastic stability was used to the problem of equilibrium selection in
games by Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993). But, these economic ap-
plications are based on “order-of-magnitude” comparisons for the transitions
between the various recurrent classes of no-mutation process (Ellison, 2000).
By this method, one state can be selected as a long-term equilibrium, which is
perturbed least by adaptive dynamics, as mutation is trivialized as necessary.
Taylor et al. (2004) analyzes a similar but different version of stochastic
no-mutation process, where a single mutation can lead to a transition from
one absorbing state to another. In this theory, the equilibrium depends on
the “expected speed of flow” at every absorbing state. This assumes that
a single mutant can escape each absorbing state from other types, and the
fate of this mutant is determined by fixation probability of two underlying
types. Also, Fudenberg and Imhof (2006) shows that there exists sufficiently
small mutation rate that no two individual mutant types cannot coexist. So
to speak, the fate of a mutant, its elimination or fixation, is settled before the
next mutant appears. Thus the transitions between each homogeneous state
occur when a mutant appears and spreads to fixation.
The advantage of this model is that transition matrix can be nicely for-
mulated by a Markov chain with state space that consists of each homoge-
neous sate and fixation probability of each state against one another. For
this Markov-style transition matrix, unique vectors can be calculated, which
is interpreted as invariant distribution of underlying stochastic process. Com-
3Their idea is that small mutation term makes the system have a different stability for
each state, then the limit of invariant distribution can be derived as the mutation probability
goes to zero (Ren and Zhang, 2008).
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pared with Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993), this method shows relative
probabilities that each homogeneous state spend with respect to competing
others. Appendix A summarizes the method of Fudenberg and Imhof (2006).
3 Cooperative vs. Opportunistic Punishment
To consider different setting and role of punisher in PGG, we look at typical
numerical examples by stochastic dynamics. The results in this section are
based on Hauert et al. (2007) (Appendix B provides short description of the
game and payoff functions).
Sequence of one-shot PGG
Most of researches including Hauert et al. (2007) has assumed an one-shot
PGG where players decide strategy or action first, and punish accordingly if
some of them want to. In this standard setup, the punisher is originated from
C and punishing behavior depends on the information on action choices of
players. What if this sequence be reversed? Players commit their punishment
first, and choose its action later. For simplicity, commitment is assumed to be
always credible, and the number of commitment is announced for participants
of a team. For C, D and L who do not care for doing punishment, this reversed
sequence may not affect their actions. For P , however, this information may
be crucial in that it conveys information about its own type. Thus, P can
choose her action depending on this information.
By reversing the sequence of PGG, we can discern two types of punisher:
cooperative (CP ) and opportunistic punisher (OP ). CP commits punish-
ment, but cooperates regardless of information of commitment. OP commits
punishment, but chooses whether to cooperate or not depending on the in-
formation. If there be few commitment, she might think that D would be
better choice to free-ride C or not to be exploited by D. We assume that an
8
individual punisher acts cooperatively with probability q that replies on the
number of punisher GP . q(·) is given by
q(GP ) = δ
GP
G
,
where δ is the responsiveness of punisher. Appendix B describes payoff func-
tions among C, D, L and P for OP case. For appropriate parameters, as is
discussed in next section, opportunistic punisher makes three different evolu-
tionary dynamics among four types by δ. For the lower range of δ, oppor-
tunistic punisher does not make cooperation evolve in a team. Opportunistic
punisher makes almost universal cooperation possible for the mid range of δ
when four types can evolved. Finally, for the upper range of δ, P can kill
D without the help of L. For later discussion, five types of players who are
casted in this paper are summarized for their actions and punishing behavior.
Name Action Punishment
C cooperation No
D defection No
L exit No
CP a cooperation Yes
OP b conditional cooperation Yes
a Cooperative punisher who cooperates uncondition-
ally and punishes defectors in her team.
b Opportunistic punisher who cooperates depending
on the level of punishing commitment.
Table 2: 5 types of players
Stochastic dynamics of CP case
Main results of Hauert et al. (2007) are regenerated in Figure 1. At first, with
voluntary participation, PGG takes circular movement around Cooperator
(C) − Defector (D) − Loner (L). The existence of L can perturb universal
defection, and make evolutionary cycle for three types, and this can be also
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observed by replicator dynamics (Hauert et al., 2002).4 Even though voluntary
participation changes universal defection in PGG, the average payoff a player
can get cannot exceed that of L. That is, volunteering itself does not enhance
the fitness of team members in equilibrium.5
As is shown in Appendix C, assuming infinitely large population, C − P
equilibrium can be stabilized for some area in S3 simplex. But, this result
just shows that cooperation can be defended only when there already exists
sufficient number of punisher. In stochastic dynamic setting, punishment alone
cannot police D since the fitness of punisher cannot be higher than that of
D ((b) of Fig. 1). This can be called “dilemma of punishment”, which is
that P can regulate defective behavior in a group, but the cost of punishment
decrease the fitness of P . Eventually, unique homogeneous state stochastically
stable is D because P cannot be always worse than D in homogeneous state
of D. In sum, neither of L and P makes any significant contribution to the
evolution of cooperation in PGG.
Interesting dynamics can be made when four types of players are involved
in PGG. Panel (c) of Figure 1 shows C − D − L − P interaction. D cannot
fixate P because of the existence of L. L, however, tends to be conquered by C
and P . The movement between C and P is random drift or neutral selection,
where all individuals have the same fitness. For this case, Any random walk
in which the probability to move to either side is identical for the transient
states leads to the same result. D can be regulated in a circular stochastic
relation among four types, and L plays a pivotal role in making a detour for
the evolution of cooperation. Hauert et al. (2007) named this mechanism “via
freedom to coercion”, which emphasize synergistic enforcement between L and
P in the process.
The role of L has meaningful economic interpretation where L can be re-
4Appendix C provides the technique and results by replicator dynamics.
5Sasaki et al. (2007) shows that when players can do mixed strategies of C or D with
volunteering, better fitness can be obtained for some parameters.
10
C
39.0%
D
12.9%
L
48.1%
0.07
0.080.
25
(a) C −D − L case
C
0%
D
100%
P
0%
0.08
(b) C-D-P case
C
14.1%
D
4.7%
L
8.7%
P
72.5%
0.08
0
.2
50.
07
0.07
(c) C-D-L-P case
Figure 1: CP case stochastic dynamics of PGG. Parameters are given by
s = 0.25, r = 3, M = 100, G = 5, β = 1, γ = 0.15, and σ = 1. The
percentage under each type is the relative staying frequency. Arrow from A
to B means that A type can fixate B type, and fixation probability is given
around the arrow. When a fixation probability is less than 1/M , it is rare event
that one type fixates another. For dashed line, fixation probability is equal
to 1/M that is the case of random drift. This automata-style presentation
helps to illustrate stochastic dynamics of PGG. (a) shows rock-paper-scissor
evolutionary cycle among C −D − L. (b) is the case that costly punishment
cannot survive under C −D − P interaction. Finally, (c) is the evolution of
cooperation with four types where P−C random drift consists of around 87%.
garded to be the alternative provided by market outside organizations based
on human cooperation. Namely, if the group of PGG can be considered as
a team or a firm, L represents market. This issue about ‘Organization vs
Market’ was treated by Alchian and Demsetz (1972). Their conclusion is that
monitoring provided by incentive-compatible residual claimant can preserve
the comparative advantage of organization over market. Evolutionary dynam-
ics of PGG explore another possibility of regulating issue in team production
without formal monitoring or hierarchy. When market provides attractive
alternatives, defection in an organization can be regulated in the absence of
direct monitoring. In this sense, prolific market and successful organization
can co-evolve in our stochastic setting.
Naturally, the evolution of cooperation in PGG with four types depends
critically on underlying parameters. Low β activates fixation from P to D
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(a) low β
C
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(b) low σ
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11.8%
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7.3%
P
34.1%
0.
1
0.08
0
.0
3
0.1
0.02
(c) low β and low σ
Figure 2: CP Stochastic dynamics of PGG when parameters are unfavorable
for CP . Common parameters are s = 0.25, r = 3, M = 100, G = 5. Parame-
ters for (a) are β = 0.15, γ = 0.15, σ = 1, those for (b) are β = 1, γ = 0.15,
σ = 0.1, those for (c) are β = 0.15, γ = 0.07, σ = 0.1. Low β creates P → D
fixation, which decreases the frequency of P . Low σ makes D → L fixation
slow, and the frequency of D increases. For related calculations, an algorithm
is written by Mathematica version 7 of Wolfram Inc.
(P → D fixation). Figure 2 illustrates effects of β and σ. For both parameters,
the evolution of cooperation is destroyed as two values decrease. Low β creates
P → D fixation, which allows D to absorb both from C and P . As σ decreases,
the flow of D → L also slows down, which increases staying frequency at D-
state. (c) of Figure 2 also shows that lowering γ does not change the frequency
of cooperative states, staying at C or P .
Stochastic dynamics of OP case
As is stated, players declare their commitment on punishing first, and choose
actions in OP case. Assuming independence in choosing actions, the expected
number of P in a team, which is equal to the number of commitment, is simply
given by q ·GP . payoffs are modified for opportunistic punisher, and stochastic
dynamics of OP case is given in Figure 3.
Numerical examples implies that OP can contribute the evolution of co-
operation in which CP loses her power as long as δ, the responsiveness of
punisher, is sufficiently high. They imply that the efficacy of OP comes from
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(b) low β and high γ
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(c) high β and low σ
C
0.8%
D
6.8%
L
1.1%
P
91.3%
0.
1
0.08
0.03
0.01
0.
06
(d) low β, low γ and low σ
Figure 3: Stochastic dynamics of PGG when P is opportunistic. One-shot
PGG proceeds to commit punishment, and choose action. Common param-
eters are s = 0.25, r = 3, M = 100, G = 5, δ = 0.8. Parameters for (a) are
β = 1, γ = 0.15, σ = 1, those for (b) are β = 0.15, γ = 0.15, σ = 1, those for
(c) are β = 1, γ = 0.15, σ = 0.1, those for (d) are β = 0.15, γ = 0.07, σ = 0.1.
As the figure shows, P → C fixation is key to the evolution of cooperation.
This dynamics is made by opportunism by P , which decreases the frequency
of C, and exploitation by D is prevented.
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Figure 4: The evolution of cooperation by OP in C−D−P and C−D−L−P .
Parameters are equal to those in (d) of Figure 3. Y -axis is sum of frequency in
C and P . For δ < 0.88, only four types, C−D−L−P can make cooperation
evolve. As δ grows, the evolution of cooperation can be made only by C−D−P
interaction. For this case, L as a depressor of D is unnecessary.
exploiting C and fighting D more successfully. When β and γ is sufficiently
high, OP cannot contribute anymore because the commitment of punishing
hurts herself to a serious level. Thus, when punishing is more effective than
a certain level, CP is more effective than OP in fostering the evolution of
cooperation in a PGG team.
Figure 4 shows an interesting dynamics of OP case. As δ approaches 1, for
some proper parameters, the help of the loner can be redundant. C−D−OP
dynamics make 100% state of cooperation at P . When δ is sufficiently high,
P ’s selfishness alone makes the evolution of cooperation.
Let us compare stochastic dynamics of PGG to replicator dynamics. Ap-
pendix C illustrates replicator dynamics of PGG. For C−D−OP interaction,
equilibria by replicator dynamics agree well with equilibrium by stochastic dy-
namics. When parameters are proper, C −D − OP interaction by replicator
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Figure 5: The evolution of cooperation when P plays C with error or tremble
rate δ. All parameters are equal to Figure 4. When δ = 0 (1), P plays D (C)
always. Results imply that simple error cannot increase cooperation in a team
compared to CP . This shows the strategical advantage of OP who plays more
sophisticated strategy than simple types of error.
dynamics make two type of NE . For this case, when β is low (but not too
much), γ is low, and δ is high, C − OP mixture with high density of OP is
NE. This is a equilibrium state that opportunism by P is sparsely observed
because of high frequency of P . As is discussed, stochastic dynamics select
this almost full cooperative state by OP over D-state when parameters are
proper.
Now, we consider how the opportunism of P helps the evolution of coop-
eration. Let us compare the behavior of OP to simple tremble or error in
playing action. As Figure 5 shows simple tremble does not help to overcome
invasion of D or fixating C, which is key part that OP plays. This implies that
opportunistic punisher has more sophisticated strategic reaction than simple
types of error.
The opportunism makes P play in a correlated way according to the com-
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position of her team informed by the level of commitment. For example, when
a team consists all of C or D except a P , OP hardly do C because commit-
ment level is low, and punishment from others is not expected. Thus, for
C-only team case, the payoff of OP is higher than CP . For D-only team
case, the payoff of OP is less than that of D, but higher than that of CP . In
the opposite instance, if a team consists all of P except one P , OP always
does C because playing D hurts her by ample of punishment. For this case P
resembles CP . That is, assuming proper size of G and sets of parameter such
as β, γ and δ, payoff of OP in three pure state are given by

pi
OP
(= G−1G r) > piCP (= piC = r − 1) for all-C case
pi
D
(= 0− β) ≈ pi
OP
(= 0− (G− 1)γ) > pi
CP
(= −1− (G− 1)γ) for all-D case
pi
OP
≈ pi
CP
(= r − 1) for all-P case,
where pi
k
is the payoff of type k.
This strategic flexibility comes from nonlinearity made by probabilistic
reaction modeled by q(Gp). When the degree of nonlinearity, δ, is sufficiently
high, OP can copy better reaction between C and D in correlated way. This
flexibility creates C → P fixation, and ends P → D fixation.
4 Calculating Fixation Probabilities by Fermi
Function
As Appendix B shows, fixation probabilities of Moran process can be defined
within a certain boundary of s, the intensity of selection. To generalize our
model, a pair-wise comparison by Fermi function is to be introduced (Traulsen
et al., 2006; Altrock and Traulsen, 2009). Fermi function defines dynamics of
payoff difference between two types for any s.6 When transition from A-type
6If we simply replace the fitness function of Moran process, (1− s) + spi, with e(1−s)+spi
to considering any s ∈ [0, 1], resulting term for fixation probability is identical.
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(a) CP case
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ρ
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(b) OP case
Figure 6: Key fixation diagrams of CP andOP . We assume proper parameters
for unrelated variables. When β is larger than a critical level, D can fixate
CP and the evolution of cooperation is made. When CP is less effective, OP
can absorb C as long as δ is higher than a certain level. This prevents D from
exploiting C, and the cooperation can be evolved by players’ opportunistic
behavior.
to B-type occurs, the probability is assumed to be
p =
1
1 + es(piA−piB)
,
which is called called Fermi function. This makes
T−j
T+j
= e−s(piA−piB).
The evolution of cooperation can be analyzed by investigating fixation
probabilities between four types. Specifically, as is implied in numerical ex-
amples in Section 3, the evolution of cooperation may depend on the fixation
between P and D, and that between P and C.
We apply three approximations to get analytic expression. 1) As 1/M →
0 can be assumed for sufficiently high M , related payoffs can be linearized
around 1/M ≈ 0 as many as necessary. 2) Approximated fixation probabilities
are categorized into two; the one is surely larger than 1/M , the other cannot
exceed it. We take the first kind as legitimate, and set the second to be 0.
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3)
∑k
k=1 · · · ≈
∫ k
1 · · · dk can be used because the error between two is O(( 1M )2),
which is plausible for fairly larger M .
Let ρij denote this simplified fixation probability of single i-type in the
population that consists totally of j-type. Common fixation probabilities for
each type of punisher are given by
ρDC = s(1−
r
G
)
ρLD = sσ
ρCL =
2
√
2s(G− 1)(r − σ − 1)
2pi + 2
√
2s(G− 1)(r − σ − 1) .
At first, these are invariant by the type of punisher. High intensity in-
creases ρDC and ρLD . When σ increases(decreases), the flow of D → L speeds
up(down), but that of L→ C speeds down(up). As is discussed in Section 3,
when σ gets smaller, the frequency of L decreases, and that of C increases
consequently. Without P , this flow ends up with higher frequency of D due
to lower ρLD .
At first, Figure 6 shows P → D and P → C fixation diagrams for each type
of punisher. When β < βCP where where βCP ≡ G−rG(G−1) , fixation probabilities
are respectively given by

ρDP = s[1−
r
G
− (G− 1)β] for CP
ρDP = 0 for OP
(a) of Figure 6 shows when CP is effective. When β < βCP , D can fixate
P . The evolution of cooperation is hindered as numerical examples shows. For
this instance, OP who plays opportunistically can make cooperation evolve in
a team. C → P fixation is a key mechanism, which weakens C → D fixation.
Different from CP case where P and C have equal fitness, OP has higher
fitness than C because OP tends to play D more as there exists more C. As
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the frequency of C decreases due to C → P fixation, the relative staying at D
does also. Numerical examples shows that ρPC for OP changes discontinuously
for a critical level of δ, δOP . This implies that players’ responsiveness to the
information can have a pivotal role in fostering the evolution of cooperation.
The analytic approach for this intuition can be done by Fermi function.
For CP , ρPC is given by 1/M . For OP , when β and γ are low as necessary,
ρPC is calculated as
ρPC = 0 for δ < δOP
ρPC =
1
G2 exp[− s(G
2−G(r+1)+rδ)
G2
]
Gs(G−r−1)+rsδ +1
for δ ≥ δOP ,
where δOP ≡
G(G2(β+γ)−G(β+γ+1)+2r+1)
(2G−1)r+2(G−1)G(β+γ) . By Fermi function, the fixation prob-
ability of ρPC for OP behaves nicely in discontinuous way as numerical exam-
ples do.
5 Concluding Remarks
For the gaming situations in which Nash equilibrium predicts general defec-
tion, the possibility of cooperation is one of the most challenging and crucial
questions of evolutionary economics and biology. This paper, in stochastic
dynamic setting, discusses an intriguing and paradoxical path to cooperation
via players’ opportunistic behavior. Different from Hauert et al. (2007) that
emphasizes the role of quitting to support P who can regulate D, by reversing
the sequence of PGG, we propose that the opportunistic behavior of P may
paradoxically make cooperation evolve in a team. Moreover, for the cases
that altruistic punisher cannot help the evolution of cooperation, our oppor-
tunistic punisher can. This comes from the dual role of opportunism: OP
can end P → D fixation, and make C → P fixation. Both fixating flows de-
crease relative staying frequency at D-state, which encourages the evolution
of cooperation.
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Finally, two future research agenda is to be mentioned. First, in this paper,
we regard δ as parameter, which determines the responsiveness of probabilistic
opportunism. Even though simplicity justifies this, more interesting results
and questions can be discussed if we make δ determined endogenously. Also,
another simplification is that the commitment of punishing is always credible.
In real world, some forms of contracts are done in this fashion by depositing
some of money to a third party for the case of non-fulfillment. However, partial
credibility of commitment may reveal more interesting and unexpected results
on the issues of this paper.
Appendix A The Stochastic Dynamics of
Generalized Moran Process
Moran process
Moran process is a classical model of population that is developed in pop-
ulation genetics, and has been imported to game theory recently. In every
time step an individual is randomly chosen for reproduction by its fitness, and
makes a single clone that replace a randomly selected other member. Moran
process represents a simple birth-death process. For the whole process, the
size of total population, M , remains constant, i.e., Moran process ignores ef-
fects of population size. This assumption of exogenous finite population size
can be considered as an approximation to a model where environmental forces
keep the population from becoming infinite (Fudenberg et al., 2004).
For studying finite populations, it is convenient to transform fitness into
convex combination of baseline fitness (generally assumed to be 1) and payoff
obtained from interaction. That is, f = (1 − s)1 + spi where f is fitness of
a player, pi is the payoff from the game. s controls the intensity of selection.
When s = 0, selection is neutral and we have random drift. For s→ 1, fitness
can be equated to payoff. Since f should be positive, there exists maximum
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s.
Fixation probability
Repeatedly applying Moran updating determines the evolutionary result of
residents and mutants. In the absence of mutations, which is in the spirit of
literature on large deviations of long-run behavior, Moran process ends up with
a homogeneous population with all residents or all invaders (Foster and Young,
1990; Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993; Kandori and Rob, 1995). Regardless
of initial state of population, eventually all members of the population consists
of one type. When this homogeneous state by one type is realized, conquering
type is said to reach fixation. It is the key to this dynamics to find fixation
probabilities of types in the population.
Let us explain how to find fixation probabilities by two-strategies case. For
M -size population, the number of A-strategy players is j, and the number of
B is M − j. The probability to increase the number of A from j to j + 1 is
denoted by T+j . Similarly, T
−
j is probability to decrease j by 1. Considering
that there exist two absorbing states with no-mutation game dynamics, two
fixation probabilities is given by
φ0 = 0 and φM = 1
where φj is the fixation probability where the number of A is j. For interme-
diate state, the fixation probability are given by
φj = T
−
j φj−1 + (1− T−j − T+j )φj + T+j φj+1, (A.1)
which is an expression of fixation probability by its one back-and-forth time
step. Rearrange (A.1) makes
0 = −T−j (φj − φj−1) + T+j (φj+1 − φj). (A.2)
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(A.2) can be suitably used to make a recursion for the differences between
fixation probabilities. For our discussion φ1, the fixation probability of a single
A individual, is particularly important. By some algebra, this is calculated as
φ1 =
1
M−1∑
k=1
k∏
j=0
T−j
T+j
. (A.3)
It is possible to calculate fixation probability for any initial state of existing
i-number of A, φi (Nowak et al., 2004; Taylor et al., 2004). Only φ1 is needed
to investigate stationary distribution with small mutations.
For neutral selection where drift is purely random, T−j = T
+
j holds, hence
φ1 is easily given by 1/M . This fixation probability of random drift is used
to judge how strong a single individual enough to fixate whole population.
When the fixation probability of a specific individual of a type is larger than
1/M , there is a statistical tendency for this type to occupy the whole popula-
tion. Otherwise, this type is easy to be fixated by other types whose fixation
probabilities are larger than 1/M . This criteria about fixation has a good
interpretation to describe mutual invasion between two types, which is useful
for our purpose.7.
Appendix B Payoffs of PGG
We denote the number of cooperator by c, defector by d, loner by l, and
punisher by p. Naturally, M = c+ d+ l + p holds. Also, 0 < σ + 1 < r < G,
and G ≥ 3 are assumed for relevant discussion. piCD , the expected average
payoff of focal C against D, is given by
7When fixation probability from A to B is smaller than 1/M , we can ignore this direction
of movement. This qualitative approach makes analysis simpler and illustrative as following
automata-style diagram shows
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piCD =
G−1∑
k=0
(
c−1
k
)(
M−c
G−k
)(
M−1
G−1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i)
(
k + 1
G
r − 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii)
,
where
(i) is the probability that there are k number of C and G − k number of
D when G-sized team is made from M -population, (ii) is the average payoff
from k-number C team. Relevant payoffs for D and L are given by
piDC =
G−1∑
k=0
(
c
k
)(
M−c
G−k
)(
M−1
G−1
) ( k
G
r
)
piLC = piLD = σ
piCL =
[
1−
(
l
G−1
)(
M−1
G−1
)] (r − 1) + ( lG−1)(
M−1
G−1
)σ.
Interactions of C, D and L with respect to P are specified by the type of
P . When punisher is cooperative type, CP , related payoff are
piCP = piPC = r − 1
piDP =
G−1∑
k=0
(
d−1
k
)(
M−d
G−k−1
)(
M−1
G−1
) [G− k − 1
G
r − (G− k − 1)β
]
piPD =
G−1∑
k=0
(
p−1
k
)(
M−p
G−k−1
)(
M−1
G−1
) [k + 1
G
r − 1− (G− k − 1)γ
]
piLP = σ
piPL =
(
M−p
G−1
)(
M−1
G−1
)σ + G−1∑
k=1
(
p−1
k
)(
M−p
G−k−1
)(
M−1
G−1
) (r − 1).
The payoffs for OP are
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pi
CP
=
G−1∑
k=0
(c−1
k
)( M−c
G−k−1
)(M−1
G−1
) [ (k + 1) + δG−k−1G (G− k − 1)
G
r − 1
]
pi
PC
=
G−1∑
k=0
(p−1
k
)( M−p
G−k−1
)(M−1
G−1
) [ (G− k − 1) + δ k+1G (k + 1)
G
r − k + 1
G
− (1− δ k + 1
G
k)(β + γ)
]
pi
DP
=
G−1∑
k=0
(d−1
k
)( M−d
G−k−1
)(M−1
G−1
) [ (G− k − 1)δG−k−1G
G
− (G− k − 1)β
]
pi
PD
=
G−1∑
k=0
(p−1
k
)( M−p
G−k−1
)(M−1
G−1
) [ (k + 1)δ k+1G
G
− δ k + 1
G
−
(
G− k − 1 + (1− δ k + 1
G
)k
)
γ − (1− δ k + 1
G
)kβ
]
pi
LP
= σ
pi
PL
=
(M−p
G−1
)(M−1
G−1
)σ + G−1∑
k=1
(p−1
k
)( M−p
G−k−1
)(M−1
G−1
) (r − 1).
For Moran process, transition probability for one forward step is given by
T+ij =
mi[(1− s) + spiij ]
mi[(1− s) + spiij ] + (M −mi)[(1− s) + spiij ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
probability for i’s reproduction
M −mi
M
,︸ ︷︷ ︸
probability for type j’s death
where mi is the number of type i, and i, j ∈ {C,D,L, P}. the probability for
one backward step is given by
T−ij =
(M −mi)[(1− s) + spiij ]
mi[(1− s) + spiij ] + (M −mi)[(1− s) + spiij ]
mi
M
.
Fixation probability for i against j is
φij =
1
M−1∑
k=0
k∏
m1=1
T−ij
T+ij
=
1
M−1∑
k=0
k∏
m1=1
1− s+ spiji
1− s+ spiij
.
As the fitness should be positive for proper φij , an upper limit on s is given
by 1/(1−minpiij).
Fixation probabilities are used for making a Markov transition matrix
between four different homogeneous states, which is

1− φ
DC
− φ
LC
− φ
PC
φ
CD
φ
CL
φ
CP
φ
DC
1− φ
CD
− φ
LD
− φ
PD
φ
DL
φ
DP
φ
LC
φ
LD
1− φ
CL
− φ
DL
− φ
PL
φ
LP
φ
PC
φ
PD
φ
PL
1− φ
CP
− φ
DP
− φ
LP
 .
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Above matrix defines entry and exit between four homogeneous states.
For example, first row describes how one mutant C influences system. The
second elements of this row shows the probability that a single mutant C
conquers or fixates D-homogeneous state. Naturally, sum of each column
should be 1. Fudenberg and Imhof (2006) shows that normalized eigenvector
to the biggest eigenvalue, 1 for this case, determines stationary distribution
for small mutations.
Appendix C Replicator Dynamics and Stable NE
Replicator dynamics for PGG in the paper can be derived by formulating
payoff for each type of player. For C −D − CP ,
piC = r(c+ p)− 1
piD = r(c+ p)− βp(G− 1)
piP = r(c+ p)− 1− γd(G− 1)
where c, d and p denotes relative frequency of C, D and P in a infinitely
large population respectively. This system can be treated by a system of
linear differential equations, and phase diagram and stable NE can be easily
given. Phase diagrams of Figure 7 shows two types of equilibrium state. For
β > 1/(G − 1), multiple stable NE are obtained as (a) of Figure 7. That is,
when punishment are sufficiently effective, the continuum of C −CP mixture
can be supported as stable NE. For β ≤ 1/(G − 1), D-state is unique NE.
Without exit option, stochastic dynamics selectsD-state as unique equilibrium
for C −D − CP .
For C −D − L case, payoffs are given by
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CCPD
(a) Multiple stable NE
C
CPD
(b) One stable NE
Figure 7: Solid circle represents stable NE, and empty circle does unstable fix
points. (a) shows that C − CP co-existence can be stable equilibria for some
area of S3 simplex. (b) shows that this evolution of cooperation disappears
when underlying conditions turn severe. Figures are generated by the modified
version of DYNAMO originally written by William Sandholm, Emin Doku-
maci, and Francisco Franchetti. (http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~whs/dynamo/
index.html)
piC = (1− lG−1)(rc− 1) + lG−1σ
piD = (1− lG−1)(rc) + lG−1σ
piL = σ,
where l denotes the relative frequency of L. Different from C −D−CP case,
C − D − L cannot be easily treated because L makes the system nonlinear
one. Brandt et al. (2003) gives a trick to formulate replicator dynamics. This
makes use of the fact that payoff difference between C and D depends only on
l. Three homogeneous states are natural fixed points. There are no other fixed
points on the boundary of S3 simplex. For r > 2, unique rest point in interior
of S3, and interior dynamics can be described by Hamiltonian system. This is
equivalent to rock-paper-scissor dynamics where rest point is surrounded by
periodic orbits as is shown in Figure 8.
Finally, payoff for OP case are given by
26
CLD
Figure 8: C −D − L interaction shows Rock-paper-scissor dynamics.
pOP
C
OPD
(a) One Stable NE and cycle
C
OPD
(b) One Stable NE
Figure 9: (a) shows the case for two stable NE, which are D-state and C−OP
coexistence. (b) shows the case for one stable NE, D-state.
piC = r(c+ (δp)p)− 1
piD = r(c+ (δp)p)− βp(G− 1)
piP = r(c+ (δp)p)− δp− γ(d+ (1− δp)p)(G− 1)− β(1− δp)p(G− 1)
By using similar method of C −D − L case, it can be checked that there
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is no fixed point in interior of S3 simplex, and unique NE exist at D and/or
C −OP boundary.8 Fig. 9 shows two typical dynamics for C −D−OP case.
For γ > 0, the condition is given by

(a) for β >
1
G− 1 ,
−γ +Gγ
−1− β +Gβ − γ +Gγ < δ < 1
(b) for otherwise.
Cooperative equilibrium made by OP in stochastic dynamics is the case of
(a) with low β, low γ and high δ. pOP in (a) of Figure 9 is given by
1
(β+γ)(G−1) .
High β and γ make pOP small, which is that region for evolutionary cycle is
enlarged. Otherwise, when region for evolutionary cycle shrinks, population
consists mostly of C and OP , which can be regarded as cooperative state.
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